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Abstract. In the development of TLS 1.3, the IETF TLS Working
Group has adopted an “analysis-prior-to-deployment” design philosophy.
This is in sharp contrast to all previous versions of the protocol. We
present an account of the TLS standardisation narrative, examining the
differences between the reactive standardisation process for TLS 1.2 and
below, and the more proactive standardisation process for TLS 1.3. We
explore the possible factors that have contributed to the shift in the TLS
WG’s design mindset, considering the protocol analysis tools available,
the levels of academic involvement and the incentives governing relevant
stakeholders at the time of standardisation. In an attempt to place TLS
within the broader realm of standardisation, we perform a comparative
analysis of standardisation models and discuss the standardisation of
TLS within this context.
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1 Introduction
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is used by millions, if not billions,
of users on a daily basis and is the de facto standard when it comes to securing
communications on the World Wide Web. The protocol was initially developed
by Netscape Communications under the name Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and
then officially came under the auspices of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) in the mid 1990s, eventually leading to the release of TLS 1.0 [32] in
1999. Subsequent versions were released in 2006 (TLS 1.1, [33]) and 2008 (TLS
1.2, [34]). Since then, TLS has received increasing amounts of attention from
the security research community. Dozens of research papers on TLS have been
published, containing both positive and negative results for the protocol. What
began as a trickle of papers has, in the last five years, become a flood. Arguably,
the major triggers for this skyrocketing in interest from the research community
were the TLS Renegotiation flaw of Ray and Rex in 2009 and the BEAST and
CRIME attacks in 2011 and 2012.
The many weaknesses identified in TLS 1.2 and below, as well as increasing
pressure to improve the protocol’s efficiency (by reducing its latency in establishing
an initial secure connection) prompted the IETF to start drafting the next version
of the protocol, TLS 1.3, in the Spring of 2014. Unlike the development process
employed for earlier versions, the TLS WG has adopted an “analysis-prior-to-
deployment” design philosophy, making a concerted effort to engage the research
2 Kenneth G. Paterson and Thyla van der Merwe
community in an attempt to catch and remedy weaknesses before the protocol is
finalised.
Given the critical nature of TLS, the recent shift in the IETF’s design
methodology for TLS 1.3, and TLS 1.3 now reaching the beginning of the end of
the standardisation process, we think it pertinent that the TLS standardisation
story be told. Prior to the standardisation of TLS 1.3, the TLS WG conformed
to a reactive standardisation process: attacks would be announced and the WG
would respond to these attacks by either updating the next version of the protocol
or by releasing patches for the TLS standard. A number of factors contributed to
the adoption of such a standardisation process. As we argue in the sequel, protocol
analysis tools were not mature enough at the time of the design, the research
community’s involvement in the standardisation process was minimal, and until
the first wave of attacks in 2009-2012, attacks on TLS were not considered to be
of enough practical import to warrant making changes with urgency. In contrast,
the on-going TLS 1.3 standardisation process has been highly proactive. The
availability of more mature analysis tools, the threat of practical attacks, the
presence of an engaged research community, and a far more open dialogue with
that community have, we contend, enabled this shift in the TLS standardisation
process.
This newer process has arguably been successful; several research works
have helped build confidence in the protocol’s design [12,35,36,42,57,64], and
others have caught flaws in a timely fashion [18,31]. The design itself has also
been significantly influenced by the research community [61], and the amount of
communication between those who implement TLS and those who analyse TLS
has probably never been greater.
Despite this relative success, we deem it important to reflect on whether
or not the TLS 1.3 process could have been improved, and indeed to what
extent it fits into the broader realm of standardisation. To this end, we briefly
consider standardisation models as employed by differing standardisation bodies
and examine their differences, advantages and disadvantages through the lens
of TLS. Specifically, we focus on the IETF, the International Organization for
standardisation (ISO) and the US government’s National Institute for Standards
and Technology (NIST). We conduct the thought experiment of identifying which
model best suits a protocol such as TLS.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper we detail the TLS standardisation process, commenting on the
recent shift in the design methodology employed by the IETF. We examine
the era of post-deployment analysis, in which the IETF reacted to protocol
vulnerabilities, as well as the era of pre-deployment analysis, in which the IETF
is actively trying to preempt protocol weaknesses. Our contributions may be
described as follows:
Pre- versus Post-Deployment Analysis. We present an account of the
TLS standardisation process, examining factors which may have contributed
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to the different standardisation cycles employed for TLS 1.2 and below and
TLS 1.3, respectively. We comment on the tools available for analysis, levels of
academic involvement, as well as the incentives driving the agents involved in
the standardisation process.
Further Improvements. We comment on how the TLS 1.3 standardisation
process could have been improved and present an alternative standardisation
cycle for security protocols.
Comparative Analysis. We perform a comparative analysis of standardisation
models and discuss the merits and faults of these models by examining their
suitability for the standardisation of critical protocols such as TLS.
1.2 Related Work
In work on standardisation transparency, Griffin [49] presents the Kaleidoscope
Conference case study which details actions by the International Telecommunica-
tion Union (ITU) to host an academic conference aimed at encouraging openness
in standards development, as well as cultivating academia as an important exter-
nal source of new ideas and technologies. We cover the concept of conferences
and workshops as a means of enhancing academic involvement but also show
that in the case of TLS 1.3, academia serves as an internal source of ideas in the
standardisation process.
Gutmann et al. discuss the importance of setting requirements for security
protocols in [50], another topic which we touch upon. But they appear to do
so in the post-analysis setting, as they discuss formal techniques for updating
requirements in response to flaws found in already published standards.
We are unaware of any work covering the complete TLS standardisation
process.
1.3 Paper Organisation
In Section 2 we briefly present background on TLS and the IETF. In Section
3 we discuss the standardisation process for TLS 1.2 and below. We cover the
process that has been followed for TLS 1.3 in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider
the standardisation of protocols beyond the realm of the IETF and we conclude
in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 TLS
We provide a high-level overview of the TLS protocol, describing only what is
relevant to the standardisation discussions to follow. We direct the reader to [34]
and [78] for further details.
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TLS is a network protocol designed to provide security services for protocols
running at the application layer. The primary goal of TLS is to facilitate the
establishment of a secure channel between two communicating entities, namely
the client and the server. The TLS protocol is made up of a number sub-protocols,
the two most important being the Handshake Protocol and the Record Protocol.
The Handshake Protocol negotiates all cryptographically relevant parameters
(including what TLS version, what authentication and key exchange method, and
what subsequent symmetric key algorithms will be used). It authenticates one (or
both) of the communicating entities, and establishes the keys for the symmetric al-
gorithms that will be used in the Record Protocol to protect application data. For
instance, if a client and a server agree on the TLS RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256
cipher suite during a TLS 1.2 handshake, then the server will provide an RSA
certificate to be used for key exchange and entity authentication purposes. In
this example, the Record Protocol will then make use of AES in CBC mode
for the encryption of application data, and SHA-256 will be used in the HMAC
algorithm to provide message authentication.
TLS 1.2 and below. The message flows for an initial TLS 1.2 handshake
are depicted in Figure 1. Messages marked with an asterisk are optional or
situation-dependent and braces of the type “[. . .]” indicate encryption with the
application traffic keys. The client and the server exchange ClientHello and
ServerHello messages in order to agree on a cipher suite and to exchange nonce
values. The communicating entities also exchange cryptographic parameters
(ServerKeyExchange, ClientKeyExchange) that allow for the derivation of the
pre-master secret. Certificates and the corresponding verification information
(Certificate, CertificateVerify) are sent for the purposes of entity authenti-
cation. A master secret is derived from the nonce values and the pre-master
secret, and in turn used in the derivation of the application traffic keys to be
employed by the Record Protocol. The Finished message comprises a MAC over
the entire handshake, ensuring that the client and the server share an identical
view of the handshake and that an active attacker has not altered any of the
handshake messages.
The Handshake Protocol runs over the Record Protocol, initially with null
encryption and MAC algorithms. The ChangeCipherSpec messages signal the
intent to start using newly negotiated cryptographic algorithms and keys; they
are not considered part of the handshake but instead are the messages of a peer
protocol, the ChangeCipherSpec protocol. Because the Finished messages come
after the ChangeCipherSpec messages, they are protected using the application
data traffic keys derived in the handshake. These messages, then, are the first to
be protected as part of the Record Protocol. They are followed by application
data messages, now protected by the Record Protocol.
The cryptographic parameters established in the initial handshake constitute
a TLS session. A session can be updated via a renegotiation handshake. This is
a full handshake that runs under the protection of an already established TLS
session. This mechanism allows cryptographic parameters to be changed (for
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example, upgraded), or client authentication to be demanded by a server. In
order to avoid the expensive public key operations in repeated handshakes, TLS
also offers a lightweight resumption handshake in which a new master secret
is derived from the old pre-master secret and new nonces, thus forcing fresh
application data keys. Each such resumption handshake leads to a new TLS
connection within the existing session; many connections can exist in parallel for
each session.
The Record Protocol, as already indicated, provides a secure channel for
transmission of Application Data (as well as Handshake Protocol and Alert
messages). In TLS 1.0 and 1.1, it uses a “MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt”
(MEE) construction, with the MAC algorithm being HMAC instantiated with a
range of hash functions and the encryption algorithm being instantiated with
CBC-mode of a block cipher or the RC4 stream cipher. Sequence numbers are
included in the cryptographic processing, creating a stateful secure channel in
which replays, deletions and re-orderings of TLS records can be detected. TLS 1.2
added supported for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
schemes, with AES-GCM being an increasingly popular option.
C S
ClientHello
ServerHello, Certificate*, ServerKeyExchange*,
CertificateRequest*, ServerHelloDone
Certificate*, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify*,
ChangeCipherSpec, [Finished]
ChangeCipherSpec, [Finished]
[Application data]
Fig. 1. TLS 1.2 handshake
C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare,, {EncryptedExtensions},
{Certificate}, {CertificateRequest*}, {CertificateVerify},
{Finished}, [Applicaiton data*]
{Certificate*}, {CertificateVerify*}, {Finished}
[Application data]
Fig. 2. TLS 1.3 (EC)DHE handshake
TLS 1.3. We provide a brief description of TLS 1.3 as defined in the current
draft 15 of the standard [78], deferring discussion of the design rationale to
Section 4. The design process for TLS 1.3 is on-going and several more drafts
can be expected before it is complete. However, at the time of writing, the major
components of the protocol appear to be fairly stable.
The message flows for an initial TLS 1.3 ephemeral Diffie-Hellman handshake
are depicted in Figure 2. Messages marked with an asterisk are optional or
situation-dependent. Braces of the type “{. . .}” indicate protection under the
handshake traffic key and braces of the type “[. . .]” indicate protection under
the application traffic key. The client and the server exchange ClientHello and
ServerHello messages in order to agree a cipher suite and to exchange nonce val-
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ues. The entities also exchange freshly generated Diffie-Hellman (DH) key shares
along with the associated set of groups (ClientKeyShare, ServerKeyShare).
The server’s first message flight will also contain extensions not used for
key establishment (EncryptedExtensions) as well as optional early application
data. Certificates and the corresponding verification information (Certificate,
CertificateVerify) are exchanged for the purposes of entity authentication;
the client will provide this information if requested to do so by the server
(CertificateRequest). The Finished messages comprise MACs over the entire
handshake transcripts using a handshake traffic key derived from the DH key
shares. These messages provide integrity of the handshake as well as key con-
firmation. As depicted in Figure 2, the Finished messages are encrypted with
handshake traffic keys, and no longer with application traffic keys as was the
case in TLS 1.2 and below. The first records to be protected by the Record Layer
are application data messages. TLS 1.3 only allows the use of AEAD schemes for
the protection of this data.
Entities may also choose to use a pre-shared key (PSK) (PreSharedKey),
or may make use of a PSK/DH combination for key exchange. In TLS 1.3,
session resumption makes use of PSKs; the same is true for transmission of early
client data, with the PSK used in both cases being established in an earlier
handshake. This so-called zero round-trip time (0-RTT) capability allows the
client to transmit data as part of its first flight of messages. Details pertaining
to these handshake modes can be found in [78]. The renegotiation handshake as
described in the TLS 1.2 RFC is no longer available in TLS 1.3.
2.2 The IETF
The IETF is a self-organized group of software developers, implementers, vendors
and researchers focused on creating and maintaining engineering standards
for the Internet. The IETF’s mission is, simply, “to make the Internet work
better” [2]. Participation by individuals is entirely voluntary and there is no
formal membership or associated membership fees. The standardisation work
done by the IETF is organised into areas, each of which contains several Working
Groups (WGs). These areas cover all protocol layers, starting from IP [75] at
the internet layer up to general application layer protocols such as HTTP [15],
making the IETF the de facto technical forum for all matters concerning Internet
protocol standards. The TLS WG falls into the Security Area of the IETF.
The IETF’s standards are published free of charge as Request for Comment
documents (RFCs). These are compiled using inputs from the WG mailing lists
and the face-to-face discussions held at IETF meetings throughout the year. The
TLS WG mailing list is remarkably active and serves as an important platform for
discussion regarding the TLS RFCs. Once published, RFCs may be augmented via
the use of extensions. These are RFCs intended to provide increased functionality
and/or, in the case of TLS, security enhancements.
The IETF follows an open model of standards development. There are no
barriers to entry with regards to membership and contributions, and there
is a many-to-one development philosophy: all contributions are pooled in the
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production of one standard, with a consensus-based process being used to decide
between competing options. Analysis of TLS results from a mixture of internal and
external sources; WG members may provide analyses at formal IETF meetings
or on the mailing list, and research originating outside of the WG may also be
consulted. In reality, and in particular for TLS 1.3, the official IETF processes
have been supplemented by a shadow process involving input from a small and
time-varying group of cryptographic protocol design experts. This input has
been fed in to the draft editor via e-mail and in informal meetings at various
conferences and workshops. Since the IETF charges no fee for its standards there
are no financial barriers to adoption.
3 Post-Deployment Analysis
The standardisation process for TLS 1.2 and below can arguably be described as
reactive. Following the announcement of attacks against the protocol, the TLS
WG has responded by either making the necessary changes to the next version
of the standard or by releasing interim recommendations or extensions. This
conforms to what we will term the design-release-break-patch cycle of standards
development. In what follows, we outline this development process as it pertains
to TLS, highlighting attacks against the protocol and the IETF’s responses to
these attacks. We focus on attacks against the protocol rather than attacks on
specific implementations (though the importance of these, for example Heartbleed
and various certificate processing vulnerabilities, should not be underestimated).
We note that each TLS version builds on the previous version, incorporating
changes where necessary. All TLS versions are currently in use, with clients and
servers often supporting more than one version. At the time of writing, almost
98% of sites probed in the SSL Pulse survey1 support TLS 1.0, with support of
TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 both being in the region of 80%.
3.1 Design, Release, Break, Patch
The TLS standard officially sprang to life with a decision by the IETF to
standardize a version of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol2 in 1996. The
growing need to support e-commerce and hence the growing deployment of the
SSL protocol prompted the IETF to this course of action. At this stage, two
versions of SSL existed in the public domain, namely SSLv2 and SSLv3 [43].
SSLv2 had a number of weaknesses, in particular offering no defence against
downgrade attacks. It was finally deprecated by the IETF in [84], published in
2011.
In 1998, Bleichenbacher published an attack on RSA when encryption used
the PKCS #1 encoding scheme [26], affecting SSLv3. The attack targets the
RSA-encrypted pre-master secret sent from client to server (see Section 2.1) by
1 https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/
2 Designed by Netscape Communications in the 1990s.
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using the distinctive server-generated PKCS #1-padding error message as an
oracle. Successive, adaptive calls to this oracle allow an attacker to narrow in
on the value of the pre-master secret, and once this is obtained, the attacker
is able to derive the symmetric keys used in the connection. The TLS 1.0
standard [32] briefly addresses this attack in a two-paragraph note that describes
the following countermeasure: a server that receives an incorrectly formatted
RSA block should use a pre-generated, random 48-byte value as the pre-master
secret instead, thereby eliminating the oracle. The Bleichenbacher attack has
been re-enabled (in various forms) in several works [52,55,69], the most recent
case being DROWN [13], a cross-protocol attack targeting all versions of TLS
running on servers that also support SSLv2. Surprisingly, a large number of
servers still support this legacy version of the protocol.3
Following the release of TLS 1.0 [32], the first significant attack against TLS
seems to be Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack [28,86]. This attack exploits the
specific CBC-mode padding format used by TLS in its MEE construction in the
Record Protocol. The TLS WG initially responded to the attack by adding an
attack-specific countermeasure to the attack in the TLS 1.1 specification [33].
This was intended to equalise the running time of the reverse of the MEE
processing – decryption, decoding, MAC verification (DDM). This knowingly
left a small timing channel, but it was not believed to be exploitable. A decade
later, in 2013, AlFardan and Paterson [8], in their Lucky 13 attack, showed
that in fact it was exploitable in a sophisticated timing attack. Notably, the
definitive patch against this attack required roughly 500 lines of new code in
the OpenSSL implementation, illustrating the difficulty of making the DDM
operations constant time. Moreover, several follow-up papers [7,10,11] have shown
that variants of the attack are still mountable in certain circumstances or for
certain implementations. The 2014 POODLE attack [71] on SSLv3 showed that
SSLv3 was also vulnerable to a related but arguably more serious padding oracle
attack, in which timing information was replaced with much more easy to measure
error information. Because of weaknesses in the RC4 algorithm (that we discuss
below), the only other encryption option in SSLv3, and because POODLE was
essentially unpatchable, this attack left no other reasonable encryption options
for SSLv3.
Following the release of TLS 1.2 [34] in 2008, we see more of a “patch” process
being adopted by the TLS WG. During this time, we saw an explosion of attacks
against TLS. We discuss some of these next.
In 2009 Ray and Rex more or less simultaneously discovered the TLS Rene-
gotiation attack4. By exploiting the lack of a cryptographic binding between an
attacker’s initial handshake and a subsequent renegotiation handshake between
an honest client and an honest server, the attacker is able to covince the server to
interpret traffic – both the attacker-injected traffic and the honest client’s traffic
– as coming from the honest client. The WG’s response to this attack was the
3 At the time of writing, 7% of the roughly 150k servers surveyed by SSL pulse still do.
4 See http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2009/11/understanding_the_tls_
renegoti.html for a description of the attack.
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announcement of a mandatory TLS extension [79] applicable to all versions of
TLS. The extension proposed including the respective Finished messages in the
client and server renegotiation Hello messages, thus creating a binding between
the two handshakes. Unfortunately, the Triple Handshake attack of Bhargavan et
al. [20] resurrected the Renegotiation attack by cleverly exploiting the interaction
of various TLS resumption and renegotiation handshakes. The attack completely
breaks client authentication.
In 2011 Duong and Rizzo announced the BEAST5 attack [38]. The attack
affects TLS 1.0 and makes use of the chained-IV vulnerability observed by
Moeller [70] and Bard [14], though it has its roots in an observation of Rogaway [80]
from as early as 1995. BEAST exploits the fact that in TLS 1.0, the final
ciphertext block of a CBC-encrypted record becomes the IV for the next record
to be encrypted. This enables an attacker with a chosen plaintext capability to
recover low entropy plaintexts. The main significance of the BEAST attack is the
clever use of malicious JavaScript running in a victim’s browser to realise the
low entropy, chosen plaintext requirement and thereby mount an HTTP session
cookie recovery attack against TLS. However, it should be noted that the attack
required a zero-day vulnerability in the browser in order to obtain the required
fine control over chosen plaintexts. The malicious JavaScript techniques were
leveraged a year later by the same authors in the CRIME6 attack (see [82] for
a useful description of the attack). Unlike BEAST, however, CRIME exploits
the compression side-channel inherent to all versions of TLS, a vulnerability
noted in theoretical form by Kelsey in 2002 [54]. Interestingly, whilst the BEAST
and CRIME attacks can be seen as having triggered the flood of research that
followed, neither came from the academic research community, but instead from
the “hacker” community (which partly explains the lack of formal research papers
describing the attacks). Both attacks required a strong understanding not only
of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, but also of how the protocol is
deployed in the web context.
The widespread response to CRIME was to disable TLS’s compression feature.
However, this does not completely solve the problem of compression-based attacks
because compression can also take place at the application layer and introduce
similar side-channels (see the BREACH and TIME attacks). A common response
to BEAST was to switch to using RC4 as the encryption method in the Record
Protocol, since a stream cipher would not be susceptible to the CBC vulnerabilities.
Unfortunately, the RC4 keystream has long been known to be biased [66], and
in 2013, AlFardan et al [9] exploited newly discovered and known keystream
biases to obtain cookie recovery attacks when RC4 was used as the method of
protection in TLS. Garman et al. [45] enhanced the statistical techniques of
Al Fardan et al. and developed password recovery attacks that were of greater
practical significance than those presented in [9]. The weaknesses in RC4 were
further exploited by Vanhoef and Piessens [85] and Bricout et al. [27]. The
IETF deprecated RC4 in March 2015 in [74]. Its usage has dropped rapidly as a
5 Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS
6 Compression-Ratio Info-leak Made Easy
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consequence of the high profile nature of the attacks, the deprecation, and the
decision by major vendors to disable RC4 in their browsers.7
Other notable attacks to follow the BEAST, CRIME and RC4 attacks include
the FREAK [17] and Logjam [6] attacks of 2015, and the SLOTH attack [24] of
2016. Both FREAK and Logjam exploit the enduring widespread support for
weak export-grade cryptographic primitives. Whereas the FREAK attack affects
certain TLS implementations, the Logjam vulnerability, in contrast, is the result
of a protocol flaw and targets Diffie-Hellman key exchange in TLS. The attack
requires a server to support export-grade cryptography, and for the client to be
willing to use low security Diffie-Hellman groups. An active attacker can convince
the server to provide an export-grade 512-bit group to a client that has requested
a non-export DHE cipher suite, and the client will in turn accept this weak
group as being valid for the DHE handshake. Clever use of a pre-computation
phase for state-of-the-art discrete logarithm algorithms in [6] allowed for the
quick computation of individual connections’ secrets. An early intimation of
these types of cross-cipher-suite attack can be found in the work of Wagner and
Schneier [87] as early as 1996. The warning from this paper seems to have been
either forgotten or ignored in subsequent developments of TLS. Moreover, from
version 1.1 onwards, export-grade cipher suites were not supported by the TLS
standards. However, as already noted, almost all servers do support TLS 1.0 and
so become vulnerable to this class of attack.
The change in TLS 1.2 from supporting the MD5/SHA-1 hash function
combination to supporting single hash functions for digital signatures meant that
stronger hash functions such as SHA-256 could be supported but alas, so could
weaker hash functions, such as MD5. Wang and Yu [88] described collision attacks
against MD5 in 2005; the SLOTH attack [24] exploits this weakness to break
client authentication in TLS 1.2 when MD5-based signatures are employed. The
attacks presented are near-practical and falsify the belief of some practitioners
that only second-preimage resistance is required of the hash functions used for
TLS signatures.
We have described, at a high-level, a number of the most prominent attacks
on TLS and the TLS WG’s responses to these attacks. We now turn to examining
whether or not these attacks were adequately addressed, and indeed, to what
extent they could have been addressed by the standardisation process.
3.2 Effective Fixing, Implementation Constraints and Time Lags
The TLS 1.2 specification provides the following cautionary note with regards to
the Bleichenbacher attack:
7 See, for example, http://www.infoworld.com/article/2979527/security/
google-mozilla-microsoft-browsers-dump-rc4-encryption.html.
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"a TLS server MUST NOT generate an alert if processing an
RSA-encrypted premaster secret message fails, or the version
number is not as expected. Instead, it MUST continue the handshake
with a randomly generated premaster secret. It may be useful
to log the real cause of failure for troubleshooting purposes;
however, care must be taken to avoid leaking the information to an
attacker (through, e.g., timing, log files, or other channels.)"
Upon first glance, the countermeasure appears adequate. However, as pointed
out by Jager et al. [52], the discovery of new side-channels and the develop-
ment of more sophisticated analysis techniques allow for the implementation
of Bleichenbacher-style attacks even though the vulnerability was thought to
be successfully patched. The attacks by Meyer et al. [69] on implementations
of TLS serve as an example of this. One course open to the TLS WG was to
remove the use of the PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding scheme in favour of the PKCS#1
v2.1 encoding scheme (implementing OAEP padding). This would have been
more secure against the Bleichenbacher attack and all envisionable variants.
However, as is explained in the TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 RFCs, in order to maintain
compatibility with earlier TLS versions, this replacement was not made. We
presume that the desire to maintain backwards compatibility and confidence in
the ad hoc countermeasure trumped the evidently better security available from
the use of PKCS#1 v2.1.
A very similar situation pertains to padding oracle attacks and Lucky 13:
an implementation patch was put in place in TLS 1.1 and 1.2, but shown to be
inadequate by the Lucky 13 attack [8]. With hindsight, it would have been less
effort overall, and less damaging to the reputation of the protocol, to reform the
MEE construction used in TLS at an earlier stage, replacing it with a modern
design fully supported by theoretical analysis (notwithstanding the positive
results of [58], whose limitations were pointed out in [73]). A repeated pattern
in the development of TLS 1.2 and below is that the TLS community (a larger
group of individuals and organisations than the TLS WG) seem to need to see
concrete working attacks before addressing a potential vulnerability or adopting
an intrinsically more secure solution, rather than applying a patch to each specific
vulnerability.
In the case of attacks that exploit the existence of primitives or mechanisms
that have long been known to exhibit weaknesses, the simple (but naive) solution
is to simply consider removing a primitive or mechanism as soon as it is shown to
be weak. However, this might not be straightforward given implementation and
interoperability constraints. In the case of FREAK and Logjam, the standardisa-
tion process cannot be faulted: the weak export cipher suites were removed from
TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 and these attacks exist as a result of poor implementation
choices by practitioners. Similar remarks apply to the IV-chaining vulnerability,
which while already known in 1995, was introduced to TLS 1.0 in 1999, but then
removed in TLS 1.1 in 2006. Unfortunately, deployed versions of TLS did not
move so quickly, with widespread support for TLS 1.0 in servers even today. On
the other hand, all modern browsers will now prefer TLS 1.2 and AEAD cipher
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suites in an initial handshake attempt, thanks to the long line of attacks on
TLS’s CBC-mode and RC4 options. In the case of SLOTH, however, the issue
might not be as clear-cut. MD5-based signature schemes should not have been
re-introduced in the TLS 1.2 RFC. And RC4 has a very long track-record of
weaknesses stretching back more than 15 years, meaning that its phasing out
from TLS could arguably have been initiated much sooner than it was, instead of
waiting for the attacks to become so powerful. In many cases, particularly where
hardware support for AES is available, AES-GCM could have served as a better
choice for encryption.
With the many research papers professing the security of the TLS Handshake
Protocol, the existence of attacks exploiting the interaction of various TLS
handshakes may have come as a surprise to the TLS community. However, even
here, there were early signs that things were amiss with the 1996 cross-cipher-suite
attack of Wagner and Schneier [87]. Perhaps the lack of a practical attack in that
paper and in later papers such as [68] led to a more relaxed attitude being adopted
by the TLS WG here. The subtle interactions of different TLS handshakes was
never fully considered in any analysis of TLS prior to the Triple Handshake
attack of 2014. It is therefore not surprising that attacks of this form would have
slipped through the standardisation process. Yet it should be remembered that
the Triple Handshake attack is a resurrection of the Renegotiation attack from
2009. This is indicative of insufficiently broad or powerful analysis having been
available to the TLS WG in the period intervening between the two attacks.
We argue that, in general and in view of the extreme importance of TLS, a
much more conservative approach to dealing with attacks on TLS is warranted.
We do, however, appreciate that bringing about meaningful change is challenging
given the large scale and wide diversity of TLS deployment, the historical reticence
of the major implementations to code newer versions of the protocol (especially
TLS 1.2), and the slowness with which users (particularly on the server side)
have tended to update their TLS versions.
3.3 Impact and Incentives
In the design-release-break-patch standardisation cycle, maximal reward for
researchers has come in the form of producing and promoting high impact attacks
against TLS, and engagement of the research community was largely encouraged
in a retroactive fashion. The obvious problem with this incentive model is that it
leaves users of published standards vulnerable to attack and imposes a potential
patch action on the TLS WG. In the next section we consider whether or not
a shift in the standardisation cycle leaves the opportunity for researchers to
have impact (of a different kind) whilst positively benefiting the standardisation
process.
4 Pre-Deployment Analysis
In contrast to the development of TLS 1.2 and below, the standardisation process
for TLS 1.3 has been proactive in nature. It has followed what we describe
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as the design-break-fix-release cycle for standards development. Working more
closely with the research community, the TLS WG has released multiple protocol
drafts and welcomed analyses of the protocol before its final release. As the next
section will show, this design philosophy has simultaneously led to the discovery
of weaknesses and provided confidence in the WG’s design decisions. We explore
the factors that have enabled this newer process by considering the improvements
in the protocol analysis tools available, as well as the shift in design attitudes
and incentives. This approach, however, has not been without its complications.
In what follows we also address the challenges inherent to such an approach and
comment on ways in which the process, a far as TLS is concerned, could have
been improved.
4.1 Design, Break, Fix, Release
The two broad design goals for TLS 1.3 are (i) to improve efficiency of the
Handshake Protocol and (ii) to address the weaknesses identified in TLS 1.2
and below.8 The initial challenge for the TLS WG was to go about achieving
these goals without having to invent an entirely new protocol: in addition to
requiring new code libraries, a new protocol might introduce new weaknesses.
The development of Google’s QUIC Crypto by Langley and Chang [63] in 2013,
offering a zero round-trip time (0-RTT) capability for the QUIC protocol [81],
put pressure on the TLS WG to consider ways of reducing handshake latency in
TLS 1.3. And, after the flurry of attacks in the preceding years, the protocol was
due an overhaul to remove weak or broken features.
In comparison to TLS 1.2 and below, the first few drafts of TLS 1.3 (beginning
with draft 00 in April 2014) incorporated changes that aim to fortify the protocol
against known attacks, such as the removal of support for compression, as well as
the removal of static RSA and Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanisms, leaving
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman as the only method of key exchange. Handshake latency
was also reduced by the introduction of a one round-trip time (1-RTT) TLS
handshake (previously an initial handshake required two round trips before a
client and a server could start exchanging application data).
Two important changes that were introduced in the drafts up to and including
draft-05 are the concept of a session hash and the removal of the renegotiation
handshake. At the time of release of draft-04, the session hash constituted a
hash value of all messages in a handshake starting with the ClientHello, up
to and including the ClientKeyExchange. The session hash is then included
in the key derivation process to prevent an active attacker from synchronizing
the master secret across two different sessions, a trick employed in the Triple
Handshake attack [21]. The removal of renegotiation prevents renegotiation-based
attacks, the Triple Handshake attack again serving as an example of this class of
attack.
8 See the TLS WG charter at https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tls/charter/ for
further details.
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In terms of analysis of TLS 1.3, Dowling et al. [35] and Kohlweiss et al. [57]
published works on draft-05, the latter set of authors using a constructive-
cryptography approach to provide security guarantees for the protocol. Their
work highlights that the design choice in TLS 1.3 to separate out the Handshake
and Record protocols helps with their analysis, and indeed with provable security
approaches in general. (Recall that in TLS 1.2 and below, the application traffic
keys derived in the Handshake Protocol were used to encrypt the Finished
messages of the Handshake Protocol itself. This interaction adds significant
complexity to analyses of TLS 1.2 and below, in particular because it violates
the standard indistinguishability security goal for a key exchange protocol.)
Dowling et al. [35] used the multi-stage key exchange model of Fischlin and
Gu¨nther [41] to show that the keys output by the Handshake Protocol could be
securely used in the Record Protocol. Their work provided several comments on
the design of TLS 1.3, thereby explicitly providing useful feedback to the TLS
WG.
In draft-07 we see the most radical shift away from TLS 1.2, with the
cryptographic core of the TLS handshake becoming strongly influenced by the
OPTLS protocol of Krawczyk and Wee [62], with many OPTLS elements being
incorporated into the draft. OPTLS has been expressly designed to be simple
and modular, offering a 1-RTT, forward secure TLS handshake that employs
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. OPTLS also offers 0-RTT support as
well as a pre-shared key (PSK) mode, capturing the use case in which a client and
a server enter into the protocol having previously shared a key. This particular
mode is of relevance from draft-07 onwards as the TLS 1.2-style resumption
mechanism is replaced with a mechanism that makes use of PSKs. This draft
included a 0-RTT handshake and key derivation schedule that is similar to that of
OPTLS, employing the HKDF primitive designed by Krawczyk [59]. The OPTLS
designers provided a detailed analysis of their protocol in [62], again providing
the TLS WG with confidence in its design choices.
However, it should be noted that significant changes were made in adapting
OPTLS to meet the needs of TLS. For example, OPTLS originally assumed
that servers’ long term keys would be Diffie-Hellman values, in turn supported
by certificates. However, such certificates are not widely used in practice today,
potentially hindering deployment of TLS 1.3. Thus, in the “translation” of OPTLS
into TLS 1.3, a two-level process was assumed, with the server using a traditional
signing key to authenticate its long-term Diffie-Hellman value. But this created
yet another real-world security issue: if an attacker can gain access to a server’s
signing capability just once, then he would be able to forge a credential enabling
him to impersonate a server on a long-term basis. Thus it was decided to change
the signature scope to also include client-supplied, session-specific information,
limiting the value of any temporary access to the signing capability. This reduces
the efficiency of the protocol, since now a fresh signature must be produced by
the server in each handshake.
Notable changes in draft-08 and draft-09 of the protocol include the
removal of support for MD5-based signatures as well as the deprecation of SHA-1-
Reactive and Proactive Standardisation of TLS 15
based signatures, partly in response to the SLOTH vulnerability [24] and as result
of pressure from practitioners and researchers to remove these weak primitives,
as evidenced on the TLS mailing list [46,47].
Cremers et al. [31] performed an automated analysis of TLS 1.3 using the
Tamarin prover [83]. Their model covers draft-10 and their analysis showed
that this draft meets the goals of authenticated key exchange. They showed this
in a symbolic model in which secrecy properties are more coarse-grained than
would be the case in a computational model, but where the interaction of the
different handshake components is easier to analyze. Cremers et al. anticipated
the inclusion of the delayed client authentication mechanism in the TLS 1.3 series
of drafts. This feature enables a server to request authentication at any point
after the handshake has completed, reminiscent of the functionality provided
by the renegotiation handshake in TLS 1.2 and below. They discovered a po-
tential interaction attack which would break client authentication. The attack
highlighted the strict necessity of expanding the session hash scope to include
Finished messages. This prevents the attacker from replaying a client signature
across sessions by binding the signature to the session for which it is intended.
Their attack was communicated to the TLS WG, and draft-11, which officially
incorporated the delayed client authentication mechanism, included the necessary
fix as part of the design. In concurrent work, Li et al. [64] analysed the interaction
of the various TLS 1.3 handshake modes in the computational setting using
their “multi-level&stage” security model. They found draft-10 to be secure in
this model. The delayed authentication threat was not identified in this work
preumably because this mechanism was not officially part of draft-10.
In February of 2016, just prior to the release of draft-12, the Internet Society
hosted a “TLS Ready or Not?” (TRON) workshop. The workshop showcased
analyses of TLS 1.3, both published and under development, bringing together
members of the TLS Working Group, researchers and industry professionals with
the aim of testing the readiness of TLS 1.3 in its then current form. Besides the
aforementioned work by Kohlwiess et al., Krawczyk and Wee, and Cremers et
al., there were several other presentations highlighting progress in the protocol’s
development, as well as the challenges still facing the TLS WG. Dowling et al. up-
dated their previous analysis to cover draft-10 [36], showing the full (EC)DHE
handshake to be secure in the multi-stage key exchange setting. Bhargavan et al.
introduced ProScript [18], a JavaScript variant of their verified TLS implementa-
tion, miTLS [3, 22]. Interestingly, ProScript also allows for the extraction of a
symbolic model for use within the ProVerif protocol analysis tool [4, 25]. This
work highlighted the potential dangers of incorporating certificate-based authen-
tication into PSK handshakes, a potential protocol extension being considered by
the TLS WG. Work on the secure of implementation of TLS 1.3 by Berdouche
et al. [16] considered how to maintain compatibility with current TLS versions
whilst protecting against downgrade attacks, and highlighted simplifications to
the protocol which could be beneficial from an implementation point of of view.
Importantly, the TRON workshop led to discussions between the WG and the
research community regarding potential simplifications and enhancements to the
16 Kenneth G. Paterson and Thyla van der Merwe
protocol. Some of these discussions are still ongoing and have informed subsequent
drafts of the protocol. The workshop also fostered an in-depth discussion regarding
the security requirements for TLS 1.3. This has led to a call for contributions
from researchers and practitioners alike [5]. It may seem surprising that security
requirements analysis was taking place at such a late stage in the process. We
comment on this further below.
At around the same time as the TRON workshop, an analysis by the Crypto-
graphic protocol Evaluation towards Long-Lived Outstanding Security (CELLOS)
Consortium, using the ProVerif tool, was announced on the TLS WG mailing
list [12,67]. This work showed the initial (EC)DHE handshake of draft-11 to
be secure in the symbolic setting.
Further publications of relevance to TLS 1.3 include the work on downgrade
resilience by Bhargavan et al. [19] and the work on key confirmation by Fischlin
et al. [42]. The first provides suggestions on how to strengthen downgrade security
in TLS 1.3 and the second provides assurances regarding the key confirmation
mechanisms used.
A smaller ad hoc meeting informally called “TRON2” took place in May 2016.
At this meeting, the latest changes to the protocol were discussed, further formal
analysis was presented, and TLS 1.3 implementations were compared.9
4.2 Available Tools
Since the release of TLS 1.2 in 2008, cryptographic protocol analysis tools have
developed and matured to the extent that they can now effectively serve a
proactive standardisation process, thereby contributing to, and perhaps even
enabling, a more collaborative design effort for TLS 1.3. Significant advances have
been made across all fronts, from lower-level primitives such as key derivation
and authenticated encryption, to higher level primitives such as authenticated
key exchange and cryptographic modelling of secure channels.
An early analysis of the TLS protocol itself can be found in the work of
Gajek et al. [44] in 2008. However, their analysis only covers unauthenticated
key exchange. Many refinements and advances in the area of provable security
for TLS have since been made. A major on-going challenge has been to provide
accurate modelling of the protocol and to capture the complexity of its many
interacting components and modes. In 2010, Morrissey et al. [72] also analysed
the TLS Handshake Protocol. However, their work only considered a truncated
version of the protocol (with no encryption of Finished messages), assumed
that a CCA-secure encryption scheme was used for key transport (which is
unrealistic given that TLS implementations employ PKCS#1 v1.5-based RSA
encryption), and relied on the random oracle model. In 2012, Jager et al. [51]
introduced the Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE)
security model in an attempt to handle the unfortunate mixing of key usage in
the Handshake and Record protocols; they used the ACCE model to analyse
certain Diffie-Hellman-based key exchanges in TLS. Their work built in part on
9 See https://www.mitls.org/tron2/ for details.
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a 2011 work of Paterson et al. [73], who introduced the notion of length-hiding
Authenticated Encryption, which models desired security goals of the TLS Record
Protocol. Further important works include those by Krawczyk et al. [60] and
Kohlar et al. [56]. The former work analysed multiple, different TLS key exchange
methods using a single, uniform set of proof techniques in the ACCE setting,
while the latter extended the work of Jager et al. to show that the RSA and
DH handshakes can be proven secure in the mutual authentication setting. Li et
al. [65] performed a similar task for pre-shared key cipher suites. Giesen et al. [48]
explicitly consider multiple Handshake protocol runs and their interactions in
their formal treatment of the security of TLS renegotiation, while Dowling and
Stebila [37] examined cipher suite and version negotiation in TLS. All of these
works offer techniques that could be harnessed, and potentially extended, in the
analysis of TLS 1.3, prior to its final release. Moreover, they represent a growth in
interest in the TLS protocol from the research community, a necessary precursor
to their greater involved in the TLS 1.3 design process.
A major step forward in the domain of program verification for TLS came
with the first release of the miTLS reference implementation in 2013 [3, 22].
The miTLS implementation integrates software security and computational
cryptographic security approaches so as to obtain security proofs for running
code. This approach aims to eliminate the reliance on the simplifying assumptions
employed by the more traditional provable security techniques – those tend to
analyse abstract and somewhat high-level models of TLS and tend to ignore
many implementation details in order to obtain tractable models (in the form
of pseudo-code) suitable for the production of hand-generated proofs; moreover,
they tend to focus on “fragments” of the TLS protocol suite rather than the
entire system. Using this approach, Bhargavan et al. provided an epoch-based
security analysis of the TLS 1.2 handshake as implemented in miTLS [23]. The
miTLS implementation provides a reference for the secure implementation of TLS
1.2 and below, and interoperates with all major web browsers and servers. Not
only has the miTLS project lead to the discovery of vulnerabilities such as the
Triple Handshake attack and FREAK, but it has also left the TLS community
with tools such as FlexTLS [1] which allows for the rapid prototyping and testing
of TLS implementations. These tools are now being harnessed to assess TLS 1.3.
The rise of automated protocol analysis tools such as ProVerif [4] and the
Tamarin Prover [83] can also be counted as a boon for the TLS WG. The more re-
cent Tamarin tool, for instance, offers exceptional support for DH-based protocols
and allows for the instantiation of an unbounded number of protocol partici-
pants and sessions, making it a good choice for the modelling and consequent
symbolic analysis of TLS 1.3. Once established, this type of model can also be
easily adapted in response to protocol changes, making this tool invaluable in an
ongoing development process.
The advances in the areas of provable security, program verification and
formal methods have contributed to a development environment in which a
design-break-fix-release stadardization cycle can thrive. Previously, the absence
of these techniques, or the limited experience in applying them to real protocols
18 Kenneth G. Paterson and Thyla van der Merwe
like TLS, would have limited the amount of pre-release analysis that could
have been performed, making a design-release-break-patch standardisation cycle
understandable, natural even, for TLS 1.2 and below.
4.3 Involvement, Impact and Incentives
In the development of TLS 1.3, the WG has taken many positive steps in aiming
to protect the protocol against the various classes of attacks mentioned in Section
3. Removal of support for weak hash functions, renegotiation, and non-AEAD
encryption modes, as well as the introduction of the session hash mechanism
serve as illustrative examples. The WG has also made design choices that have
eased the analysis of the protocol, such as making a clean separation of the
Handshake and Record Protocols, for instance. This is undoubtedly a positive
step by the WG to respond to the research community’s needs, marking a shift in
the WG’s design mindset. The TRON workshop also displays a desire by the WG
to involve the research community in the design of TLS 1.3, and to incorporate
its contributions. The research community, on the other hand, has gained a much
greater awareness of the complexities of the TLS protocol and its many use cases,
and has tried to adapt its analyses accordingly. In view of the rising interest in
and focus on TLS in the research community over a period of years, and the
attendant refinement of its analysis tools, this community has been in a much
better position to contribute to the TLS 1.3 design process than it was for former
editions of the protocol.
The ability to adapt the protocol in response to potential attacks, such as those
identified by Cremers et al. [31] and Bhargavan et al. [18], makes for a stronger
protocol and has allowed the WG to implement changes pre-emptively, hopefully
reducing the need to create patches post-release. In comparison to the previous
process described in Section 3, the design-break-fix-release standardisation cycle
appears to leave the incentives for researchers unchanged, with a number of
top-tier papers being produced prior to the protocol’s finalisation. However, it’s
notable that these papers provide positive security results about TLS 1.3 rather
than new attacks. We consider this to be as a result of the research community’s
stronger appreciation of the importance of TLS and its greater awareness of the
value in contributing to its standardisation than in former development cycles.
4.4 Areas for Improvement
Although a positive step with regards to collaboration between researchers
faced with analyzing TLS and the engineers faced with implementing TLS, the
analysis-prior-to-deployment design strategy is not without its difficulties. Greater
numbers of contributions, be they from researchers and/or implementers, have
led to conflicting design opinions, potentially creating a greater administrative
overhead for the TLS WG. The increase in uncoordinated contributions has also
meant that the TLS 1.3 draft specification has become a rapidly moving target.
This has increased the amount of analysis work required and has rendered some
analyses ‘outdated’ within the space of few months, potentially frustrating those
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those engaged in analysis of the protocol. The varied contributions have also
created tension between the researchers looking at TLS 1.3, with those focused
on implementation concerns suggesting improvements to the potential detriment
of those concerned with the provable security aspects of the protocol. This has
been an on-going issue in the area of key derivation and key separation, for
example. The time scales for analysis could also potentially be more favourable:
not only do rapid changes require quick analysis, but with the WG/IETF wanting
official publication of TLS 1.3 within a few months of publishing the final (or a
near-final) draft, this does not leave much time for detailed analysis of the final
version of TLS 1.3. This is unfortunate for a protocol of such critical importance.
It is also the case that, due to the inevitable gaps in understanding between
the scientific community and the more engineering-focussed participants in the
TLS WG, there is the potential for miscommunication (in both directions). While
we are not aware of specific instances where miscommunication or misunder-
standing has seriously hampered the development of TLS 1.3, it is true that the
formal security analyses presented to the WG by the research community do
involve assumptions concerning attacker capabilities and the strength of the used
cryptographic primitives. Sometimes these assumptions, while well understood
in one community, may not be so obvious to another. One example of this would
be the use of idealised cryptographic assumptions in some of the analyses based
on formal methods; another (in the other direction) would be constraints on the
TLS 1.3 handshake stemming from the use of Hardware Security Modules for
storing server private keys.
A related area of potential improvement in the process is that of the identifica-
tion of security and functionality requirements for TLS 1.3. We noted previously
that only after the TRON workshop in February 2016 did it become apparent
that a complete and explicit set of requirements was missing. This suggests that a
different design process for TLS 1.3 could have been adopted: requirements analy-
sis, design, prove, release. Instead, it appears that while some of the requirements
were established early on, many others emerged only through discussion during
the design phases. It is perhaps naive to hope that such a linear process would
be possible for a protocol as complex as TLS, with its many use cases and with
many stakeholders being involved in the development process. Certainly, multiple
cycles of the “design” and “prove” steps might be needed. On the other hand,
perhaps a TRON-like workshop could have been held at the commencement of
the process, with the objective of flushing out the design requirements.
Finally, an issue throughout the process has been uncertainty over the degree
of change permitted in TLS 1.3 relative to TLS 1.2. Initially, changes were to be
incremental, potentially limiting the thinking of some participants to consider
only less radical designs. Now, it is hard to argue that TLS 1.3 is anything other
than a complete protocol redesign — a TLS 2.0 rather than a TLS 1.3, let us say.
What novel ideas might have been brought forward had that been clear from the
start?
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5 Beyond TLS 1.3
Given its importance and pervasive nature, it is possible that the successful rolling
out of the highly collaborative, fast-paced, proactive standardisation process
may be unique to TLS. To what extent can the TLS case serve as a trendsetter,
paving the way for the IETF, and indeed other standardisation bodies, to foster
stronger ties with security researchers? Or is TLS an outlier in this regard?
Involvement of researchers is by no means unheard of in the standardisation of
security mechanisms and protocols but does the importance of TLS increase the
willingness of the research community to get involved in the process?
We now examine how the newer, proactive standardisation process for TLS
compares to the processes inherent to other standardisation models, such as those
employed by ISO and NIST, and question to what extent these differing models
would have been suitable for the standardisation of TLS. We also comment on
the extent to which these models encourage active participation from the security
community.
ISO. This standards body conforms to a closed model for standardisation. As
with the IETF, standardisation work is organised into areas which are managed
by technical committees. These committees are further broken down into sub-
committees, with subcommittee 27 (SC27) being responsible for the creation and
maintenance of standards concerning security techniques10. Within this subcom-
mittee, WG2 is responsible for the standardisation of cryptographic mechanisms.
The members of an ISO WG are not individuals but rather National Bodies
(NBs) and standardisation decisions are made by the WG based on comments
and contributions received from participating NBs. The formation and make-up
of these NBs undoubtedly varies from nation to nation, but by and large, this
type of model is characterised by barriers to entry as far as contributions are
concerned as the process is far more “members only” in comparison to the open
model employed by the IETF.
The development philosophy is arguably many-to-one as many members
provide inputs to one standard but an ISO security standard will generally
contain a number of mechanisms aimed at providing a security service, and will
not be dedicated to one protocol, as is the case with the TLS RFCs. Inclusion of
mechanisms in SC27 WG2 standards is usually subject to the mechanisms meeting
certain maturity conditions – research from external sources is consulted and
where required, NBs may perform additional analyses. This maturity requirement
would potentially not suit a dynamically shifting protocol such as TLS 1.3, and
the closed nature of the standardisation process potentially discourages high
levels of external academic involvement. Also, ISO imposes a fee for its standards,
creating a financial barrier to adoption, a less than ideal situation for a critical
protocol such as TLS. The NB structure of ISO also brings into question the
10 Other ISO subcommittees also standardise security mechanisms, such as SC17 which
focuses on cards and personal identification but we focus our discussion here on SC27.
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possible motives of state actors that may be involved in the standardisation
process, a potential concern for a ubiquitous protocol such as TLS.
NIST. We focus here on the competition model used by NIST. This model was
employed successfully in the development of AES [40] and SHA-3 [39]. This model
exhibits no barriers to entry as the competitions are public and the development
philosophy is one-to-one, since only one proposed candidate is selected for stan-
dardisation and contributions from the respective competitors are not pooled in
the creation of the final standard. A necessity of the competition model is that
algorithm/protocol requirements are clearly established and communicated. The
announcement of the SHA-3 competition in the Federal Register in 2007 [77],
for instance, contained sections covering minimum criteria as well as evaluation
criteria. Analysis of the SHA-3 candidates was performed by NIST and the larger
cryptographic community, with many comments being communicated on the
public hash forum set up for the competition. Many of the analyses culminated
in top-tier publications (see [29] for a comprehensive list), thereby productively
serving academic incentives as part of the standardisation process. NIST also
held several SHA-3 conferences as a means of obtaining public feedback.
Some of the elements of the SHA-3 standardisation narrative overlap with
the TLS 1.3 standardisation process discussed in Section 4. The analysis-prior-
to-deployment development methodology, the use of public mailing lists and the
hosting of public conferences/workshops are all aspects in which the TLS 1.3
process is similar. But the process differs in that the requirements for TLS 1.3
were not fully expressed before the design commenced. There is of course no
explicit element of competition, differentiating the competition model from the
open model. On the other hand, individual researchers and research teams do
stand to gain greatly by having their ideas adopted in TLS 1.3, whether through
personal kudos or recognition that is internal (promotion, company awards) or
external (prizes, paper citations). Finally, the SHA-3 competition ran for several
years (from 2007 to 2012), allowing more time for detailed analysis.
Like the open model, there is no cost associated with the final product and this
model could most certainly work for TLS. However, it is doubtful whether such
a model would allow for the rapid development of the protocol, as we have seen
with TLS 1.3. The competition model has proven to be suitable for cryptographic
primitives like block ciphers and hash functions. A complex protocol such as TLS
might be too large in scope for any one research team to design in its entirety,
perhaps making a collaborative standardisation model more appropriate.
6 Conclusion
We have presented an account of TLS standardisation, starting with the early
versions of TLS, right up until TLS 1.3, which is, at the time of writing, nearing
completion. We have described how the process for TLS 1.2 and below fits the
design-release-break-patch cycle of standards development and how a shift in
the process has resulted in the standardisation of TLS 1.3 conforming to the
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design-break-fix-release development cycle. We have commented on the factors
that have influenced the shift in the TLS WG’s design methodology, namely,
the protocol analysis tools available, the levels of involvement from the research
community, and the incentives driving the relevant stakeholders. This newer
process exhibits benefits over the cycle employed previously as it allows for the
preemptive detection and fixing of weaknesses, thus producing a potentially
stronger protocol and reducing the need for patches post-release. We have gone
on to suggest that the process for TLS 1.3 could have been enhanced even further
by the WG considering a requirements analysis-design-prove-release cycle for
development of the standard. We have also examined the standardisation of TLS
in relation to a number of varying standardisation models. We find that the
current, collaborative process under the open model of the IETF shows promise
in producing a strong protocol but that the competition model as employed by
NIST would also potentially have suited a protocol such as TLS.
We believe our work to be the first attempt at a TLS standardisation diegesis,
and that a detailed classification of standardisation models, based on further case
studies, would make for interesting future work.
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